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Strategie Defection Across Elections, Parties, and Voters
Tue approach is relatively straightforward with regards to the measurement of defection. We are looking at people who vote for a party that is not their preferred one. The only issue concems the measurement of preferences, which is discussed below. Note that the point of reference is the voter's preference in a specific election, not one's traditional party loyalty. A number of studies, in the United States in particular, have looked at the sourees of partisan defection, that is, voting for a party other than one identifies with (see Kemell 1977; Beck 2002) . In this study, we are interested in desertion from one's short-term (sincere) preferenee.
Tue approach is more indirect when it eomes to ascertaining the strategie component of defection voting. Strictly speaking, we would need to tap voters' perceptions about the likely outcome of the election in the district, in the legislature, or with respect to the composition of the govemment (see Blais, Dostie-Goulet, and Bodet 2009). Suchdata are not available in the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES). We thus proceed indirectly. People may decide to desert their preferred party for all kinds of reasons, ~ome strategic and some nonstrategic. We extract the most important nonstrategic consideration, and then we assume that what is left is mostly strategie.
Tue most important nonstrategie reason for deserting one's preferred party is simply that one prefers the Jeader of another party and puts greater weight on Jeaders than on parties. As Tverdova mentions in Chapter 6, election campaigns ean be highly candidate-oriented, and there is growing evidenee that a substantial number of voters vote on the basis of their views about party leaders (see Poguntke and Webb 2005; Aarts et al. forthcoming) . When the best-liked leader does not belong to the best-liked party, there is an incentive to desert the preferred party, and this may have nothing to do with strategic motivations. As indicatedbelow, we can identify those deserters who support the party of the preferred leader, and we construe them not to be strategie deserters.
We consider all deserters whose desertion is not leader-indueed to be strategic. There are other nonstrategie reasons for deserting one's preferred party, the most obvious being the willingness to cast a personal vote (Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987) . There is some evidence that a number of voters focus on local candidates when deciding how to vote (see Blais et al. 2003; Marsh et al. 2008, ehapter 8 ) and some of them may end up defecting from the preferred party beeause they just like a local candidate from another party. Unfortunately, the CSES data do not allow us to screen out such a local candidate vote. There are good reasons to assume, however, that the local candidate vote is much smaller than the party leader vote (Blais et al. 2002) while at the same time more likely to be idiosyncratic rather than systematic, and thus that non-leader-induced desertion is mostly strategic.
While we focus on strategic defection, we do not assume that non-Oefectionthat is, voting for one's preferred party-is necessarily nonstrategic. lt is indeed possible for a strategic voter to vote for her preferred party, if she does so in part because she believes that this party is a viable option (Abramson et al. forthcoming) .
We wish to relate the propensity to strategically desert one's preferred party to characteristics of elections, parties, and voters. There is strong evidence for each in the existing literature.
Electoral system
We first consider characteristics of elections. While the conventional wisdom is that strategic voting is most prevalent in single-member plurality systems, in a comparative study Gschwend (2009) shows that the frequency of strategic voting in an electoral district is negatively correlated with district magnitude. As a consequence, most studies focus on strategic voting in the United States (Abramson et al. 1992; Burden 2005) (Aldrich et al. 2005) . A comparative study of elections in the United States, Britain, the Netherlands, and Israel even comes to the provocative conclusion that there may be no difference in the overall magnitude of strategic voting between firstpast-the-post, runoff, and PR elections (Abramson et al. forthcoming).
Three observations can be made about the contrast between first-past-thepost and PR elections. First, no voting system is immune from strategic considerations (Gibbard 1973; Satterthwaite 1975) . Second, strategic voting seems to be easier in single-member district plurality elections. All that voters need to know is who the top two candidates are in their local constituency. In a large PR district, it becomes more difficult to determine which six or seven parties are viable among the twelve that are running (Cox and Shugart 1996) . This has led Cox (1997, 122) to suggest that "strategic voting fades out in multimember districts when the district magnitude gets above five." Gschwend (2007b) and Lago (2008) show, however, that even in large districts voters can use a simple shortcut to ascertain party viability-that is, whether the party won at least one seat in the previous election. Third, there may be more options for strategic voting in a PR system. There are likely to be more parties, and so there is a greater likelihood for voters to find another party (besides the most preferred one) that is deemed tobe "acceptable,'' a necessary condition for agreeing to desert one's first preference (Blais 2002). Furthermore, there are a greater variety of strategic considerations in a PR system because voters may be concemed not only with the outcome of the election in their local district but also with the formation ofthe (coalition) govemment after the election (Blais et al. 2006) . On the one hand, voters might anticipate the impact of their vote on policy and
Strategie Defection Across Elections, Parties, and Voters engage in some sort of policy balancing by voting for parties that take more extreme positions than their most preferred one (Kedar 2005; Bargsted and Kedar 2009 ). On the other hand, there is evidenee of at least three different types of Strategie behavior in Austria and Germany. First, is a "rental vote." Major party supporters might cast their vote strategieally in favor of a preferred junior eoalition partner if this party is perceived as uneertain to pass a minimum vote threshold. Second, small party supporters might avoid wasting their vote for the preferred party if it is not expected to pass the minirnum vote threshold, and, thirdly, there is explidt strategie eoalition voting to influenee the eomposition of the next eoalition govemment (Gschwend 2007a; Meffert and Gsehwend 2009 ). The upshot is that the link between the electoral system and strategie voting is not obvious. Still, we test the standard hypothesis aeeording to which there is less desertion of the preferred party in PR elections.
Tue above hypothesis posits a simple eontrast between PR and non-PR elections. But that dichotomy may be too emde. On the one hand, there are some mixed systems (Massieotte and Blais 1999). On the other hand, some PR systems are less proportional than others, espedally beeause of low district magnitude or high thresholds (Taagepera and Shugart 1989; Lijphart 1994) . We therefore distinguish electoral systems on the basis of their degree of disproportionality.
Party characteristics
We consider not only the electoral system but also the potential irnpact of the electoral supply side. We first look at the number of parties eontesting the election. The assumption is that the greater the number of available options the more likely voters ought to feel that there is at least one other party that is "good enough" to support. Seeondly, we eonsider the degree to which the party system is polarized (Dalton 2008b) . lt is not clear, however, how polarin1tion could affect strategic desertion. lf more polarization means more choice we should observe more desertion; but if this means greater ideological differentiation among the parties, this could reduce the incentive to defect from one's first choice.
We assume that the temptation to desert one's preferred party also depends on the nature of that party. Tue most irnportant characteristic is the party's relative strength -that is, the percentage of the vote obtained -at the constituency level. The most common incentive for casting a strategic vote is probably the desire not to waste one's vote on a party that has no ehance of winning. The literature has referred to forms of « inverse » strategic voting, at the expense of strong parties (see Cox 1997; Blais 2004; Blais et al. 2004; Gschwend 2004 Gschwend , 2007a , but the most frequent pattern must be desertion of the weak. We test the hypothesis that, everything eise being equal, weak parties are more likely to be deserted.
Citizens, Context, and Choice

Voter characteristics
We finally examine voters' charaeteristics that may foster the propensity to vote strategically. We focus on two characteristics: level of information and strength of party attachment. We test the hypothesis that better-infonned citizens are more inclined to vote strategically (Duch and Palmer 2002; Gschwend 2007a) , presumably beeause it is easier for them to assemble infonnation about the possible outcomes of the election. Tue second characteristie is party attachment. lt is one of the most robust findings in the strategie voting literature that strong partisans are less likely to behave strategically than weak-or nonpartisans (e.g., Karp et al. 2002; Gschwend 2007a) . We therefore expect strategic defection to be most frequent among nonpartisans and most rare among strong partisans.
The dato
Our analyses examine legislative (lower house) elections in module II of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES). Table 8 .1 lists the twentyfour countries and the twenty-five elections that are covered by the study.
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Tue pooled data set includes 24,080 respondents who reported having voted in the election and with no missing data on any of the variables included in the analysis.
As indicated above, the dependent variable is whether the person strategically deserts her preferred party. For a person to be eonstrued as a strategie defector, two conditions must be met. First, the person must vote for a party other than the preferred party. Seeond, the defection should not be due to the fact that the person votes for her preferred leader.
To deterrnine a respondent's preferred party, we rely mostly on her ratings of the various parties on a 0 to 10 scale (see chapter appendix for inforrnation on this variable). Tue party that receives the highest rating is deemed to be the preferred party. This is relatively straightforward. There are two problems with this approach, however. First, respondents were typically invited to rate up to six of the more popular parties (in terrns of vote share) in the country. The implication is that some of the smaller parties were not rated, and so those who prefer a small partywere not allowed to rate that party. This is a particular coneem for us since we expect supporters of small parties to be more prone to defect. To correct for this problem, we consider whether the respondent indicates that there is a (small, unrated) party that she feels closest to. For these individuals, the preferred party is defined as the party to which they feel closest.
The second problem eoncems ties in party ratings. Seventeen percent of the respondents give their highest ratings to two parties or more. In those cases, again, we consider whether they indicate that they feel closest to any party. The party that the person feels closest to is then construed tobe the preferred party.
Strategie Defection Across Elections, Parties, and Voters In short, for the great majority (82%) of respondents, the preferred party is the one that receives the highest rating. For a minority, that is, those with ties on highest party ratings and those who feel doser to a small party that is not rated, the preferred party is the party they feel dosest to. According to the fi.rst condition, 26 percent of the respondents vote for a party that is not the preferred one.
Tue second condition for being construed as a strategic defector is that the defection ought not to be due to preferences among the party leaders. As a consequence, all defectors who vote for the party whose leader they evaluate the most positively are defined as not strategic. This leaves us with 22 percent strategic defectors.
Citizens, Context, and Choice
There are alternative ways of measuring strategic defection, and more specifically party preference. Ülll approach relies mainly on responses to questions where people are asked to tell how much they like or dislike the various parties. The party that is liked the best is construed to be the preferred party. We believe that this is the most direct and adequate indicator of voters' preference. There are problems with such ratings, the most important being that different people use the scales in different ways (see Brady 1985) . The problem is not as serious in this case since we are not comparing party ratings across individuals.
Still, it is useful to deterrnine if the findings are sensitive to the way the dependent variable is measured. We have explored one alternative, in which the preferred party is defined as the party that is perceived by the individual as closest to her position on the Left-Right scale.
4 Tue assumption here is that the preferred party is the party that is perceived to be most proximate on the overall Left-Right dimension. lt seems to us more logical to infer preferences on the basis of questions about likes and dislikes than on the basis of questions about ideological orientations but we acknowledge that perceived ideological proximity to a party can be used as an indirect indicator of preference. When preference is measured in terrns of ideological proximity, we get higher figllles for "defection" (37% instead of 26%) and "strategic desertion" (25% instead of 22%). This suggests that preference is measured less adequately. Because the ideological measure of preference is noisier (see Chapter 4), there are more people whose vote choice does not appear to coincide with their sincere preference, thus yielding higher numbers of defectors. We deterrnine how similar or different the patterns are with this alternative measllle. Table 8 .1 indicates the proportion of strategic desertion in each election. lt is extremely high in Brazil and particularly low in Spain. Tue finding regarding Brazil is consistent with Ames, Baker, and Renno results (2009), which show an exceptionally high level (70%) of ticket-splitting in that country. Ames, Baker, and Renno (2009, 18) conclude that this is so because "Brazil's elections for the national legislatllle are localized affairs, with voters choosing native sons and daughters attractive because of their presumed ability to deliver local-level public goods." There is clearly a lot of defection in Brazil but defection seems to be induced by local candidates rather than being strategically oriented.
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Because we are unable to take into account such local candidate vote, the Brazilian estimate of strategic defection is problematic.
Among these twenty-five elections, sixteen were held under PR, four under plurality (Canada, United States, United Kingdom) or majority (Australia), and five were mixed systems. Among the latter, voters have two votes in Albania, Gerrnany, and New Zealand, while they have only one vote in Taiwan and Mexico. Mexico is classified as PR because it has a corrective component while Taiwan is coded as non-PR because it is a parallel system (Massicotte and Blais 1999). As for the countries with two votes, we consider each vote separately. Note that we ean examine only the (national) PR vote in Albania beeause of lack of infonnation about respondents' single-member district. Table 8 .2 eompares the proportion of strategie desertion in PR and non-PR systems. Contrary to eonventional wisdom, there appears to be as much strategie defection in PR as in non-PR elections.
7 We also wish to distinguish eleetions on the basis of how proportional or disproportional their outeomes are. To that effect, we use the Gallagher disproportionality index (see the volume appendix). Table 8 .2 suggests that there may be no relation between frequency of strategie desertion and level of disproportionality. Citizens, Context, and Choice
In order to eharacterize the politieal supply side we eonsider two different dimensions: the number of parties eontesting the election and the overall polarization of the party system. Tue number of parties is an indieator of the opportunity structure: the more parties are eontesting the election, the easier it is to desert the most preferred party. We use the effective number of eleetoral parties (see the volume appendix). Table 8 .2 indieates that the likelihood of strategieally defecting from the preferred party is modestly eorrelated with the effective number of parties. Tue second factor eharacterizing the political supply side is party system polarization (see the volume appendix). Table 8 .2 suggests that strategie defection is somewhat more frequent when there is less polarization.
We also take into aeeount the preferred party's electoral strength. As indieated above, the temptation to desert one's preferred party should be stronger when that party is weak. Our measure of party strength is the proportion of the vote received by the preferred party in the respondent's eonstituency. Table 8 .2 eonfirms that strategie defection is negatively correlated with popular support for the preferred party.
Finally, we consider two characteristics of voters: strength of partisanship and politieal inforrnation. Our indieator is whether the respondent feels closer to any party and how strongly she feels. There are four eategories: very strong identifieation, somewhat strong identifieation, not very strong identification, and no identifieation. Table 8 .2 shows that the propensity to east a strategie vote declines with party attaehment.
Tue final variable is the respondent's level of inforrnation. CSES eollaborators were invited to include three factual questions ( one relatively easy, one relatively difficult, and one "medium") to tap people's level of information about politics; the specifie questions vary across countries. We have centered and standardized the variable, and so we are tapping people's level of inforrnation, relative to their eountry's mean and variance. 9 As can be seen in Table 8 .2, the amount of strategic defection seems tobe similar across information groups.
Multivariate analyses
We wish to determine whether and to what degree the propensity to strategieally defect from one's preferred party depends on eharacteristics of voters, parties, and elections. Given that our dependent variable is dichotomous, we estimate a logit model predicting the propensity to strategically defect depending on the seven factors discussed above. Table 8 .3 presents the estimation results of a model incorporating our three individual-level and four contextual-level variables, and a dummy for Brazil, where the estimated amount of strategie desertion is exceptionally high and problematie, as explained above. To aeeount for nonindependenee in the structure of the CSES data we report standard errors that are clustered by election. The results are rather clear-cut. Two of the three individual-level variables, party identifieation and strength of the preferred party, are signifieant while the four eontextual variables (the electoral system, the degree of disproportionality, party system polarization, and the effective number of parties) are not.
10 Not surprisingly, the Brazilian dummy variable is also highly signifieant. The hypotheses that nonpartisans and supporters of weak parties are more prone to east a strategie vote are eonfirrned, but there is no support for the expectation that the better inforrned are more prone to strategieally desert their preferred party.
The nil findings regarding the direct impact of eontextual factors are eonsistent with the weak bivariate relationships observed in Table 8 .2 and are not due to eollinearity. Tue eorrelations between eontextual factors are modest, and in no case does a signifieant effect emerge if one of them is omitted. This nil finding may be the most important result of this study. Tue eonventional wisdom aeeording to whieh there is less strategie voting in PR or less disproportional systems is not supported by the data. Tue verdict is similar to the one reached by Abramson et al. (fortheoming) on a smaller set of nations.
Even though eontextual factors do not have a direct effect on strategie voting they maywell interact with individual-level variables (see the introduction). We forrnulate two hypotheses in this regard.
Tue fi.rst hypothesis is that information has a smaller effect in more disproportional systems such as fi.rst-past-the-post. Presumably, all that is required in such a system is to determine whether a given party is one of the two strongest competitors in the constituency, something that may be easy to ascertain in most circumstances. In more proportional systems with !arge districts, it is more complicated to know which parties do or not have a chance to win a seat (but see Gschwend 2007b , 2009 and Lago 2008 and, perhaps more importantly, the focus of attention is likely to shift to potential government coalitions, about which information may not be easily available.
Tue second hypothesis is that the propensity to desert weak parties is stronger in more disproportional systems. Tue assumption is that in disproportional systems those who vote strategically abandon their weak fi.rst choice in order to support a more viable alternative while there are more varieties of strategic considerations in more proportional systems and as a consequence weak parties are not as systematically disadvantaged.
Tue second column ofTable 8.3 tests these two hypotheses. Tue fi.rst hypothesis is not supported. There appears to be no relationship between information and strategic defection, in very disproportional as weil as in very proportional systems. However, the second hypothesis is clearly confi.rmed. As expected, the propensity to desert weak parties is considerably stronger in more disproportional systems. This nicely squares with the reported negative correlation between frequency of strategic voting and district magnitude in Gschwend We checked whether there were other interaction effects between our contextual-level and individual-level variables. Not surprisingly, there is a positive interaction effect between the strength of the preferred party and PR, which means that the desertion of weak parties is less widespread under a PR system, which is the flip side of the negative interaction effect with disproportionality reported in Table 8 .3. We also find that the impact of partisanship is weaker as the number of parties increases. More importantly, given the findings displayed in the other chapters, there is no evidence of any interaction effect between polarization and the three individual-level variables.
We can also determine how different our results are depending on whether we measure defection on the basis of party ratings or party proxirnity and whether we take out leader-induced defection or not. Table 8 .4 tests the sensitivity of our findings to the operationalization of the dependent variable. As can be seen, the pattems are similar across the various specifications. In all estimations, partisanship has a strong negative impact and there is a powerful interaction effect between strength of preferred party and disproportionality. Tue only difference is that disproportionality is positively correlated with the general measure of defection but not with the specific indicator of strategic desertion.
Tue implications of our findings are illustrated in Figure 8 .1, which shows how the predicted probability of strategic defection declines with the preferred -------party's electoral strength in elections with relatively low or high degrees of disproportionality (one standard deviation below or above the mean). The propensity to defect is much more strongly dependent on party strength in more disproportional systems. Figure 8 .1 indicates that, as we would expect, strategic desertion of weak parties is more frequent in more disproportional systems.
11 But the figure also shows that while there is hardly any strategic defection from strong parties in more disproportional elections, we observe some non-negligible desertion of these strong parties in more proportional elections. The pattem is reversed at the high end of party strength: desertion is more frequent in more proportional systems. This is why there is no difference overall, between PR and non-PR elections (fable 8.2 and Table 8 .3, column 1).
The findings regarding the interaction between disproportionality and party strength are in line with our predictions. The downward sloping lines indicate that in all systems weak parties are more likely tobe deserted than their stronger counterparts. The pattem, again, is much stronger in the most disproportional elections.
The preceding analysis is based on robust duster logit estimations. One could argue that a hierarchical linear model (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002) would be more appropriate. But Arceneaux and Nickerson (2009) show that at least in some conditions there is no meaningful difference in the findings produced by these two methods. As an additional check on the robustness of our results, we performed a multilevel analysis with random intercepts as weil as random slopes.
Tue findings are presented in Table 8 .5. Tue results of the multilevel model are quite similar to those of the robust duster logit estimations presented in Table 8 .3. None of the contextual variables has a direct effect on strategic defection. Among the individual-level variables, partisanship is the most powerful variable. And there is a strong interaction effect between strength of preferred party and disproportionality. Tue only difference is that according to the multilevel model information has a main negative effect and a positive interaction effect with disproportionality 12 while the robust duster logit estimation indicates that neither effect is significant. We infer that the results conceming the impact of information are not robust, and we conclude that information has no dear impact on the propensity to strategically desert one's preferred party. 
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Conclusion
We have looked at the propensity to strategically defect from the preferred party across elections, parties, and voters. We have used the CSES module II data set to compare twenty-four countries, twenty-five elections, and 24,080 voters. We find dear support for the effect of two individual-level characteristics. Strong partisans and supporters of strong parties are much less prone to desert their preferred party. Contrary to our expectations, however, the better informed are not more prone to strategically defect. There is no support for the view that only the most sophisticated dtizens have the ability or the information required to think strategically. This indicates that voters might not need a PhD in political sdence to strategically defect their most preferred party. Rather the electoral environment is likely to provide voters with cues that fadlitate strategic voting.
But perhaps the starkest results concern the nonimpact of contextual factors. Our findings are consistently negative. There is no support for the conventional wisdom that there is more strategic defection in more disproportional systems 13 or for the alternative hypothesis that it is easier to desert a preferred party when and where there are more alternative options. The only substantively important contextual effect is a conditional one. While strategic desertion is almost exdusively at the expense of the weakest parties in the most disproportional systems, the bias 1s more muted in the most proportional systems.
We hope to have shown that the CSES data set offers a great opportunity to study strategic defection in a comparative perspective. Tue most important advantage assodated with the CSES is that it covers an a wide variety of elections with very different rules and party systems, which allows us to examine in a systematic fashion how contextual factors affect the propensity to desert one's preferred party.
CSES has some drawbacks. The most important disadvantage is that because it is a postelection study it is impossible to take into account voters' subjective expectations about the outcome of the election. Still, the survey questionnaire could be improved to allow us to better measure whether people do ( or do not) vote for their preferred party. We would suggest two such improvements. First, it would help if there were a direct question asking respondents what party they like the most. The existing set of questions that tap how much people like or dislike the most important parties is extremely helpful but it has two shortcomings. The first is that the weakest parties are exduded, and so it becomes impossible to identify supporters of the smaller parties, which are precisely the most likely to vote strategically. The second is that the rating questions produce a number of ties. The solution, it seems to us, is very simple. CSES could just add the following question: "All in all, which party did you like the most in this election?" Secondly, it would be possible to include questions tapping how much respondents care about the outcome of the election, at the district level l Strategie Defection Across Elections, Parties, and Voters and with respect to government formation, and whether they thought that their vote might eount, perceptions and attitudes that should be related to the propensity to vote strategieally. We eould also gauge expectations indirectly by better describing the electoral environment in that regard. For instance, it would be helpful to know how many seats a party actually won in each electoral district and whether parties issued positive or negative eoalition signals before the election about which parties they are willing to form a goveming eoalition with (Meffert and Gsehwend 2009) .
Tue data presented here, as well as in the literature reviewed above, make it dear that it is ineorrect to assume that vote ehoiee merely reflects voters' preferenees. They also indieate that strategie defection is not eonfined to the least permissive electoral systems or highly informed voters. Strategie voting is pervasive for all types of voters and it oecurs in all kinds of eontexts. If we want to understand what voters express in the ballot box, we need to determine how their sineere preferenees interact with the rules of the game in affecting their final vote decision. 
Appendix
CSES survey variables
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. Tue difference is relatively modest, however. Tue predicted probability of strategically deserting a party with 1 percent of the vote in the district is .6 in a more disproportional system, compared to .49 in a more proportional system. Tue difference would be twice as !arge if we were to contrast the most and least disproportional elections. 12. Note that these results rnore or less contradict our initial hypothesis that information has a srnaller effect in rnore disproportional systems. This hypothesis would entail a positive rnain effect for information and a negative interaction effect; we observe exactly the opposite in Table 8 .5. 13. There is rnore strategic desertion of weaker parties in rnore disproportional systerns but this is counterbalanced by less desertion of stronger parties.
